The Assault on Israel's Legitimacy
The Frustrating 20X Question:
Why Is It Still Growing?

Condition, Direction and Response

November 2016
Version A
“This document is an important step forward in confronting one of the main challenges to Israel and the Jewish people in our time. Its analysis is careful and considered, sets out well the current situation, and advances valuable proposals for a coherent global Jewish response.”

Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks

"The correlation between the Ministry's mode of operation and what comes out of this document is very high, and has already proven effective, I am glad to see that we share a very similar point of view regarding the challenge and desired strategy."

Sima Vaknin-Gil

Director General, Ministry of Strategic Affairs
Executive Summary

ARC: The ADL-Reut Partnership

In January 2016, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Reut Group launched a partnership to fight the assault on the legitimacy of the state of Israel. This partnership was the ‘ADL-Reut Collaboration’ (ARC).

ARC was launched on the foundations of both organizations’ shared outlook, viewing delegitimization of Israel as a form of anti-Semitism in its singular denial of the universal right of self-determination to the Jewish people alone, as well as a shared commitment to the well-being and security of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

Since its inception in 1913, ADL has been a leader in fighting anti-Semitism and all forms of prejudice and bigotry, and in its commitment to a thriving, secure, democratic and Jewish state. It is motivated by a long-standing commitment to supporting Israel including its quest for peace through a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a Two-State Solution. Its commitment to fighting against the delegitimization of Israel stems from its view that this phenomenon today serves as a potent platform for manifestations of anti-Semitism across the world and runs counter to the goal of obtaining a peace agreement in the future.

The Reut Group has been committed to responding to the challenge of the assault on Israel’s legitimacy since the fall of 2008. The intended effects of Reut’s work on this issue, as initially defined in its seminal work of January 2010, Building a Political Firewall against the Delegitimization of Israel, were to be a catalyst for the emergence of a pro-Israel network that turns the tables on the delegitimizers, while re-uniting the Jewish world around Israel.

The keystone of ARC is this joint Strategic Framework for countering the assault on Israel’s legitimacy, highlighting the condition and direction of this challenge and introducing response principles. This report is designed to serve the entire field of those advocating on behalf of Israel’s fundamental legitimacy. Our aim is that it will complement and reinforce existing initiatives, which are successful, and inspire new ones.

ARC was launched on the basis of extensive field research. In total, some 150 meetings, interviews and site visits were held with governmental and non-governmental entities in Israel and in the U.S., particularly in NYC, Boston, the San Francisco Bay Area and Washington DC, as well as with organizations and activists from Europe. ADL and Reut are grateful to all of them for their contribution and generosity of time and spirit.
Scope and 'The 20X Question'

This Strategic Framework is designed to serve people and organizations in positions of authority, leadership and influence, engaged in combatting the delegitimization of Israel. These organizations and individuals, from across the political spectrum and around the world, represent a multiplicity of outlooks and approaches and bring a broad range of assets and capabilities to dealing with this challenge. That diversity is essential.

The focus of this report is the ‘20X question:’ How can it be that the collective investment of the Jewish community in dealing with this challenge is estimated to be twenty-fold bigger over the past six years, yet results remain elusive? According to some rough estimates, in 2016 the Jewish community in the U.S. alone will have invested 20 times more resources in fighting the delegitimization of Israel compared to its investment in 2010. Nonetheless, the challenge to the fundamental legitimacy of Israel, presented among other aspects, by BDS campaigns, and the collateral rise in anti-Semitism, are growing around the world.

In order to address this question, this report identifies and highlights key gaps in the collective outlook and approach in the understanding of and response to this challenge. It also offers principles and guidelines for a more efficient and effective response.

ADL and Reut hold this report to be a ‘Version A’, which brings together our conclusions and recommendations within a coherent framework. Its purpose is to serve as a platform for accurate and focused professional discussion of its observations, conclusions and recommendations. Feedback will be collected over the coming few weeks and months will be integrated into a full and comprehensive ‘Version B’.

This report aims to provide the ‘big picture’ of the condition and direction of its subject matter. Hence, while it aims to mention all key dynamics related to the delegitimization of Israel, it does not provide significant analysis in key related areas, which merit further investigation but fall beyond its scope, including:

- A global mapping of the delegitimization campaign or of local dynamics and trends in specific countries;
- Complete historical context for the contemporary manifestations of delegitimization;
- Deep analysis of the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, political process or final status issues;
- The status of Israel’s non-Jewish communities, and primarily its Arab minority;
- Specific ‘answers’ to critics of Israel or Zionism;
- A thorough examination of Iran’s role as a leading state instigator of delegitimization and anti-Semitism;
- Broader challenges of countering violent extremism and the strategic threats facing Israel and the United States from terrorism.
As this report is meant to provide overarching strategic coherence to all ongoing efforts, it does not contain detailed descriptions of the specific initiatives, programmatic and operational, that ARC will design and launch. This report also should not be read as an assessment of the efficacy of any individual program or initiative in the field.

**Key Findings: A Competition of Adaptation**

*2010 was a turnaround year for the fight against delegitimization.* It was then, primarily following the so-called Gaza Flotilla, that the State of Israel and many Jewish communities around the world awakened to the scope of this challenge. This resulted in a robust global effort to combat delegitimization, underwritten with new resources. Nonetheless, delegitimization persists, the movement that supports it has expanded and has increased its effectiveness and sophistication, and an unfavorable “spirit of the time” (*Zeitgeist*) remains prevalent. These dynamics underlie the conundrum of the ‘20X question’.

Hence, **the key focus of this report is the pro-Israel network’s need to improve its own adaptive capacity and to out-adapt the delegitimization network and the delegitimization movement.** Transforming the pro-Israel network into a significant and sustained adaptive entity will provide the network with a sustained advantage over the delegitimization movement, allowing it to accomplish successive and repeated achievements and to ultimately diminish dramatically the question regarding Israel's right to exist from public discourse. **This will require a series of structural investments, the upgrading of some operating principles, and developing new knowledge regarding several key aspects of the challenge.**

**Structural Response**

Four structural recommendations are highlighted in this report:

- There is an acute need to **upgrade the information-gathering and strategy-building capabilities of the pro-Israel network, and to better integrate them with field activities.** This will require an effective feedback loop among information-gathering and analysis, strategizing; research, development and experimentation, and operations.

- Against this backdrop, **cyberspace, broadly defined, stands out as a crucially important arena (for monitoring and counter and pro-active strategies)** which requires more resources and attention due to its current influence, rapid growth and growing complexity.

- **Many of the entities comprising the pro-Israel network should ‘professionalize’** by focusing their efforts in areas where their attributes create a unique value proposition in the field.

- There needs to be **investment in simple, flexible, affordable and scalable platforms and tools to support local communities and key niche efforts** e.g. for information gathering and analysis, project management, collaboration and learning.
Operating Principles
Several operational principles need to be integrated into the work of the pro-Israel network:

- **Articulating the right goal**: The overall effect the pro-Israel network should strive for is to alter the unfavorable Zeitgeist in which Israel’s legitimacy is determined — Alongside the efforts to counter delegitimization, a pro-active and positive campaign aimed at generating a ‘legitimacy surplus’ for Israel is essential. The successes of the delegitimization success can be attributed to a favorable Zeitgeist. Without focusing on the underlying Zeitgeist, every "victory" against delegitimization may only have short-term tactical significance.

- **Segmented Long-Tail response** - The “Long Tail Model” we use in this document to explain the challenge, distinguishes between several groups, including the ‘delegitimizers’ who lead the campaign, harsh and soft critics, as well as ‘bystanders’. It explains how the delegitimization campaign increased its base of support by appealing to broader audiences, and demonstrates how the pro-Israel network can adopt different strategies of engagement vis-à-vis each group.

- **A united, not unified, response** — The Long Tail Model highlights the diversity of the groups that comprise the growing delegitimization movement. Therefore, it also highlights the essential need for a broad and diverse Jewish and pro-Israel coalition against it, which is able to work together despite inevitable deep differences in outlook and values. For such a coalition to emerge, the pro-Israel network needs to narrow the definition of what constitutes delegitimization, acknowledging the particularly vital significance of those who are willing to fight delegitimization among progressive groups even as they criticize Israeli government policies.

- **Thought Leadership** – Since the delegitimization movement is founded on intellectual arguments that challenge the foundations of Zionism, there is a need to systematically counter those arguments with equally appealing and sophisticated approaches.

Emerging Challenges
The concepts below were identified as increasingly important issues facing the pro-Israel network with significant potential impact on Israel’s legitimacy. They require not only research and learning, but also new types of activities:

- **The Rise of ‘Intersectionality’** – Because of a discourse of intersectionality, the delegitimization movement has successfully been able to frame the Palestinian struggle against Israel as part of the struggle of other disempowered minorities, such as African-Americans and the LGBTQ community, and therefore to include itself in the loose-coalitions of these groups that support each other’s causes;

- **Framing of Israeli-Arabs as a disenfranchised indigenous population** that increasingly has been marginalized by legislation, government policies and public discourse. This framing naturally enhances the challenge posed by the trend of intersectionality;

- **Breakdown of the two-state solution** – The expansion of the delegitimization movement, particularly on campus and especially since 2014, has been fueled by the breakdown of the political process between Israel and the Palestinians and the perceived lack of commitment by the Government of Israel to end the control over the Palestinians in the West Bank. This has also been fueled by a concomitant rise in public discourse within Israel fa-
voring outright annexation of territories. In other words, the inability of governmental action to provide a credible horizon for the resolution of the conflict legitimizes non-governmental action and activism.

- **Anti-normalization** – This idea, which rejects any interaction with Israelis or increasingly with supporters of Israel in any form, even in conferences explicitly devoted to peace and dialogue, but also in other arenas, has been expanding among Palestinians as well as among Arab political figures in Israel. In recent years and in a much milder form, it has been spreading within the Western countries, mainly manifested in academia and on campuses.

- **Israel’s internal issues of religious pluralism** – Among the majority of US Jews who affiliate non-Orthodox, growing criticism of Israel’s treatment of non-Orthodox denominations and the dominant role of the Chief Rabbinate fuels indifference and resentment toward Israel. The embodiment of this dynamic is the controversy over egalitarian prayer at the Western Wall. However, this dynamic is an opportunity that BDS can exploit and diminishes the coherence of the pro-Israel network.

- **The Palestinian Authority (PA) has embraced a confrontational diplomatic approach**, adopting some of the delegitimization campaign’s language and tactics in the pursuit of its aims. This contributes toward a decline of the negotiation paradigm, and also may enhance the coordination and feedback loop between activities around the world and within the West Bank, up until now the delegitimization campaign has been executed almost exclusively by Western organizations, without real PA backing. Unless properly addressed, this new conduct of the PA could complicate many aspects of the BDS campaign and constitute a strategic surprise to Israel with meaningful national security implications.

- **The targeted boycott effort against Israel’s continued presence in the West Bank, and particularly the settlements, is gaining momentum.** This effort, exemplified by product labeling by the EU, now increasingly is embraced in some form by a both progressive Israelis as well as among liberal Zionists outside Israel, who frame their positions as motivated by effort to secure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state. This trend may eventually affect many Jewish institutions, as the demand for clarity about positions regarding initiatives “across the Green Line.”

- **The Silent Boycott** – While most explicit BDS initiatives are blocked, a more prevalent collateral damage emerges in the form of a silent boycott – undeclared decisions by organizations, companies, and individuals to refrain from engaging with Israeli entities motivated by ideology or simply by a desire to avoid unnecessary problems and criticism.

- **Anti-BDS legislation?** – Recent years have seen a surge in legislative efforts, especially in the U.S., legally curtailing BDS activities. However, these efforts raise concerns about a backlash due to what is framed as an infringement on free speech, and the effectiveness of this legislation and unintended consequences remains to be seen.

- **U.S-Israel Relations post elections** – The election results in the US may lead to a set of paradoxical outcomes related to delegitimization. In the short term, potentially warmer relationship between the new administration in Washington can be expected with the Government of Israel. This is likely to strengthen Israel’s standing in the international arena. Furthermore, at a time of unprecedented polarization within American society, these warm relationship may paradoxically exacerbate the challenges in other arenas, to the extent that strong negative views toward the administration – prevalent among many
American Jews and non-Jewish liberals and progressives – will be associated with Israel and its policies.

Over the past six years, the pro-Israel community has shown remarkable mobilization and growth as it stood up to the challenge of Israel’s delegitimization. No doubt the professional branch within the Government of Israel, led by the Ministry for Strategic Affairs (MSA), has inserted a great degree of sophistication and creativity to the pro-Israel network. Moreover, the evolving approach of the MSA seems to be consistent with the conclusions of this strategic framework.

It is now time to upgrade the capacities of the pro-Israel network, eventually turning the table on the delegitimators.
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Acknowledgments

This Strategic Framework is the product of the partnership and collaboration between the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), led by its CEO, Jonathan Greenblatt, and the Reut Group, led by Founder and Honorary President, Gidi Grinstein. This partnership was launched in January 2016.

More than 150 experts, academics, activists, and practitioners from across the political spectrum of the Jewish community, in Israel, the U.S. and elsewhere have been engaged in the course of this joint effort since January 2016. Their wisdom and experience have contributed to this Strategic Framework. In addition, we have conducted extensive research of texts and videos. The full list of contributors to this effort is available as Annex to this document.

The Reut Group effort within this partnership was led by Ms. Talia Gorodess, Managing Director of the Reut Institute, which is the research and strategy arm of the Reut Group. Other Reut team members who contributed to this effort include Mr. Gidi Grinstein, Reut Group Founder; Ms. Clareta Treger, head of the Reut team which looks into the assault on Israel’s legitimacy; and Mr. Igal Ram, Founding Director of Firewall Israel, Reut’s web-platform for fighting the delegitimization of Israel. In addition, the Reut Group is grateful to our consultants: Mr. Eran Shayshon, Associate Director at APCO Worldwide Tel Aviv office, and former Director of Policy and Strategy at Reut and Rabbi Douglas Kahn, Executive Director Emeritus of the San Francisco Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC). We are also grateful to our research associates: Wendy Wagner and Reuben Berman, and to our web-intelligence analysts: Ran Boldor and Jennifer Poliakov-Zhorov. Finally, the Reut Group is deeply grateful to American Friends of Reut, and specifically to the Lisa and Michael Leffell Foundation, the Rodan Family Philanthropic Fund, the Margolis Family Foundation and the Rose Project of Orange County, and to Joe and Tina Wolf for their support of this effort.
Background: The Assault on Israel’s Legitimacy

The 20X Question: 20-Fold More Resources to What Effect?

1. **Since 2010, the assault on Israel’s fundamental legitimacy has become a major concern for both the Government of Israel and Jewish communities around the world.** While, anti-Zionism has existed since the inception of Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel, in 2001 at the World Conference Against Racism (known as the Durban I Conference) it shifted in a significant way to affect Western societies particularly within liberal elites and progressive circles. For about a decade, until the Gaza Flotilla incident of May 2010, this assault was mostly disregarded and underestimated except in specific ‘hot spots.’ However, in recent years it has become a rallying cry in Israel and among Jewish communities around the world. (For an overarching historical context of the assault on Israel’s legitimacy, see Reut’s Conceptual Framework: Building a Political Firewall against the Delegitimization of Israel, January, 2010 and the forthcoming ADL White Paper on Delegitimization).

2. **As the State of Israel and its allies awakened to the scope of this challenge, this has led to a robust coordinated global effort to combat delegitimization on every front, from international fora to university campuses.** Dozens of new organizations and initiatives, small and large, have been launched with generous funding; the Government of Israel focused its Ministry of Strategic Affairs on this issue; and many existing organizations increased their activities in this area. These efforts have transformed the pro-Israel movement in terms of talent, technology, and organization.

3. **However, many remain concerned that despite these investments, the challenge of delegitimization persists and evolves, and the unfavorable spirit of time to Israel (Zeitgeist) remains prevalent.** In fact, it is broadly agreed that this massive effort by the Jewish community and the State of Israel has not yet led to a decisive ‘victory’ against the delegitimization of Israel nor has it anchored Israel’s fundamental legitimacy.

Understanding the Delegitimization of Israel and the BDS Challenge

4. For the purpose of this Strategic Framework, the delegitimization of Israel is defined as the singular negation of the right of the State of Israel to exist as the expression of the Jewish people’s right to national self-determination. It constitutes an assault on the political, security, and economic model of the State of Israel with the vision and objective of bringing about its implosion. This campaign is inspired by the political implosion of Apartheid South Africa, the Soviet Union, and East Germany.

5. **In singling out the State of Israel, in delegitimating and demonizing it, and in denying Jewish nationalism, this campaign represents a form of anti-Semitism, and indeed often promotes explicitly anti-Semitic ideas and imagery in pursuit of its aims.** However, anti-Semitism is merely one driver of the campaign, which is also driven by other motives.
6. **A narrow definition is crucially important for an effective response and ultimately for achieving success** because it focuses on those who are true adversaries of Zionism, the Jewish people, and the State of Israel, rather than on a much wider array of those who might be critical of aspects of Israeli policy. In contrast, any expansion of this definition significantly compromises prospects for success, because it causes internal disagreements among the pro-Israel movement and expands the group of perceived adversaries.

7. **The delegitimization campaign of Israel currently manifests in five distinct arenas:** In the media; in international organizations, particularly the United Nations; within different national governments through political positions taken by their governments or politicians; through legal means, known as ‘lawfare’; and by the Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS). A sixth method of ‘mega-events’ (e.g. Flotillas and Flytillas) was generally abandoned by the end of 2012 despite sporadic attempts to revive it.

8. **The BDS Movement is the chief effort and strategy of the delegitimization movement.** Its goal is explicitly to inspire and mobilize a global movement of organizations and individuals to take action against Israel. Notwithstanding the fact that its actual economic impact has been limited if not marginal, its main effect has mainly been in defining the discourse around Israel and mobilizing new supporters. **BDS is merely one tactic in the campaign to delegitimize Israel,** and recent trends indicate that it may be declining at least in the U.S., which should not be taken to mean that delegitimization itself is in decline.

9. **It is important to note that, at this point, even if the BDS campaign is marginalized, the delegitimization of Israel by would likely continue in other forms.** Indeed, recent successes in the fight against BDS activities in the U.S. have led to some new directions in that campaign, which are evident in 2015 and 2016.

**A Network and a Social Movement with a ‘Long-Tail’**

10. **The campaign to delegitimize Israel and the BDS movement are organized as a network and operate as a social movement.** This means that they are ‘flat’ with no single entity or group of individuals that are ‘in charge.’ Instead, most of their activities are initiated locally and in a bottom-up fashion. Achieving success against a network must therefore be defined in terms of the aggregate of local wins.

11. **This anti-Israel campaign takes place in multiple arenas.** These include, but are not limited to campuses and academia, ‘cyberspace’, in labor unions, churches, me-
dia and within the NGO community and international or multinational organizations. While one of the conclusions of this Strategic Framework is that each of these arenas requires a specialized treatment, designing strategies specific to each is beyond the scope of this paper.

12. **The ‘Long Tail model’ is essential in explaining and understanding the delegitimization campaign and the community that drive and support it.** The model highlights four groups:

- **‘The head’ is made up of a relatively small number of hard-core delegitimizers** who explicitly or tacitly negate Israel’s right to exist and the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. They comprise the instigators of the delegitimization movement;

- **‘The body’ is made up of a larger number of ‘harsh critics.’** These are mostly individuals or organizations, often found in academia, media outlets, international organizations or NGOs, who espouse profound and consistent criticism of Israeli policies and conduct. Their work can serve to substantiate the claims of the delegitimizers (at times inadvertently) and more centrally as the justification for the mobilization of the Long Tail;

- **The ‘Long Tail’ is made up mostly of individuals who are critical of Israeli policies.** They can embrace some of the terminology and methods used by the instigators due in large part to their opposition to Israel’s policies or simply because of the predominant ‘spirit of the-time’, or Zeitgeist. Most of them do not share the vision or fundamental motivations of the delegitimizers, nor do they seek Israel’s elimination.

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1 During the interviews we conducted, sixteen arenas were identified, with the most prominent of them being academia and campuses; cyber space and social media; traditional media e.g. TV, newspapers and radio; among corporations and in the area of trade and commerce; in the fields of arts, culture and sports; among labor unions, churches and religious institutions; through diplomacy, politics and official policies; among international institutions and specifically the United Nations; and the field of law.
• A yet larger group of ‘bystanders’ is made up of those who have not yet shaped their opinion of Israel, and are part of the target audience of the delegitimization campaign.

13. **Distinction among these groups is essential for success.** Successful engagement with each group fundamentally requires different approaches and tools. Furthermore, approaching one group with assumptions or tools designed to target another can prove ineffective and even counterproductive. Mislabling the Long Tail as “delegitimizers,” for example, can serve to diminish credibility and drive away elements of the Long Tail that can otherwise be engaged and drawn away from the delegitimization movement.

14. **There is a feedback loop between the Long Tail and the Zeitgeist:** the delegitimization campaign catalyzes an unfavorable Zeitgeist. This environment in turn, amplifies the harsh critics and legitimizes their statements and actions, which draw intellectuals and elites that shape public attitudes toward Israel and influence progressives and liberals. That, in turn, fuels the Zeitgeist. **In this manner, the instigators are able to create an impact far greater than their actual size and true ideological appeal.**
Competition of Learning and Adaptive Capacities

15. The 2010-2016 period has shown that both sides of this struggle possess very significant adaptive capacities. The ability to learn and adapt is the crucial characteristic of success in a dynamic system and a rapidly changing environment. In terms of adaptive capacity, both sides are performing significantly better in 2016 compared to 2010.

16. A key message and focus of this report is that the pro-Israel network’s major challenge is to improve its own ‘adaptive capacity’ and to out-adapt the delegitimization network.

The Rise of the Delegitimization Network

17. The World Conference Against Racism, otherwise known as the Durban Conference, held in Durban South Africa in 2001 is often seen as a turning point in the effort to delegitimize Israel and signaled the rise of a global delegitimization movement. It was then that a current form of the global anti-Israel movement began to emerge and begin to shape the prevailing zeitgeist. Initially this movement was driven by radical left-wing groups, primarily based in Europe, in coalition with Islamic associations. In recent years, however, it has been mainstreamed, primarily within left wing audiences, but it is no longer limited to a radical fringe.

18. The growth of this movement was based on a few strategic principles:

- **Challenging the fundamental intellectual underpinnings of Zionism** and offering an alternative narrative which emphasizes the dislocation and disenfranchising of Palestinians, as well as the continuity between Zionism, colonialism and global imperialism. This narrative frames the Palestinian struggle and anti-Israel sentiments and action as part of anti-colonial movements and necessitates therefore solidarity among all those resisting colonialism. Thereby it clashes with Zionism’s basic moral claim as a movement for the national liberation of the Jewish people, which is indigenous to the Land of Israel based on the universal right of national self-determination; for this reason, the narrative takes aim at the identity of the Jewish people as a nation.

- **Framing Israel as an Apartheid state**, associates Israel with the racist and immoral system of governance that existed in South Africa, thereby demonizing and delegitimizing it. The objective at its core is to associate Israel with a morally reprehensible political system rather than as a function of any particular policy. This outlook takes aim at the legitimacy of Israel’s basic political model -- of be-
ing both Jewish and democratic -- as morally bankrupt and fundamentally leading to discrimination against Palestinians within Israel;

- Deliberately blurring the line between criticism of Israel and the fundamental delegitimization of Israel, allows the delegitimizers to gain sympathy for their cause among the elite and general public, and to build alliances with other disenfranchised groups.

- Sugarcoating its real goals within a discourse of ending the occupation, embracing a discourse of human rights and international law and by placing exclusive responsibility on Israel. In other words, it builds its coalitions by framing Israel as solely responsible for the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and removed from the history or reality of Israeli Palestinian negotiations and mutual responsibilities.

- Legitimizing attacks on Israel’s civilian population while delegitimizing the defensive use of military force against Arab and Palestinian terror organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

19. A feedback loop exists between the delegitimization campaign in Western countries and the logic and network of Moqawama (resistance), which includes Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Brotherhood associations around the Middle East and primarily in Europe. As demonstrated in Reut’s previous conceptual framework, the logic of the Moqawama rejects Israel’s fundamental legitimacy and any normalization with it, and therefore the campaign to delegitimize Israel fits within a broader strategy to bring about Israel’s implosion. Furthermore, these actors, who were outflanked by Israel’s military superiority in the battlefield, now view international and public opinion pressure as a tool to circumvent Israel’s comparative military advantage on the battlefield. While clearly this network has been fundamentally challenged in recent years due to regional events, we believe that they still adhere to their goal through the following avenues:

- Iranian state-sponsored anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial (Iran’s role in the assault on Israel’s legitimacy is beyond the scope of this Report);

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3 The collapse of Syria and the involvement of Hizbollah in the fighting there, the escalating tension between the Sunnis and the Shiites, the rise of ISIS and other non-state actors, the massive immigration to Europe, the strategic and visible coordination between Israel and Egypt, the mutual interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States - are only few of the regional changes that have reshuffled the priorities of members of the Moqawama Network. In fact, the tension between Hamas and its former patron Iran (and its proxy Hizbollah), raises the question regarding the viability and relevance of this network.

4 In a book written by Iran’s leader Ayatollah Khamenei called “Palestine,” Khamenei calls for a long period of low-intensity warfare designed to make life impossible for Israeli Jews and excludes the two-state formula in any form. Khamenei counts on what he sees as “Israel fatigue” among the international com-
Undermining the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and rejecting the principle of two-states-for-two-people and therefore a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This principle emanates from the fundamental rejection of Israel’s basic political model, which mandates that any Israeli-Palestinian agreement that accords legitimacy to Israel is flawed and illegitimate. Paradoxically, for practical reasons, Israel’s control over the Palestinian population in the West Bank is seen as a strategic asset, as it constitutes a growing strategic, political, and diplomatic liability for the State of Israel;

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare targeting and using civilian population: the rationale of the delegitimization network allows for systematic targeting of the Israeli civilian population and using Palestinians as human shields. Meanwhile, it is deployed to prevent or limit Israel’s use of military force to protect its citizens in response.5

The Second Lebanon War of 2006 can be seen as a milestone in this regard. Massive waves of anti-Israel protests sprung up in multiple European capitals against Israel, although the war was ignited by a military operation of Hezbollah and continued with unrelenting attacks on Israeli civilian population centers. In 2010, the groups sympathetic to Hamas led major strategic operations against Israel, e.g. the Gaza Flotilla, that brought together its operatives with anti-Israel activists primarily from Europe.

20. For nearly a decade, the delegitimization network expanded primarily in Western Europe and gradually also in the United States, encountering little resistance or awareness, including from the Government of Israel. This reality changed in 2010.

The Pro-Israel Network: Steep Learning Curve and Significant Successes

21. Events in 2010 served as a wake-up call for Israel and Jewish communities around the world in relation to the expanding global movement to delegitimize Israel. With the Gaza Flotilla incident, this movement began to be seen as a strategic threat by Israel and many Jewish communities around the world.

22. Since then, a massive investment of resources and talent has been directed to contain and marginalize this assault, and a variety of organizations, tools, and methodologies were con-

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23. This coordinated global effort to combat delegitimization on every front resulted in several meaningful successes included the following (not by order of importance):

- **The creation of a world-wide pro-Israel network**, which is mobilized to confront the assault on Israel’s legitimacy.

- **Decline of ‘Mega Events’**: As of the 2010 Gaza Flotilla, all such subsequent ‘mega events’ have been circumvented, and that strategy has been effectively abandoned by the delegitimization campaign as of 2012;

- **Neutralization of the Lawfare campaign against Israel**: To date, no criminal complaints filed against Israeli officials or army personal have advanced to an indictment and many have been dismissed. All civil proceedings filed against the State of Israel and its officials in this regard have also been dismissed at an early stage of the proceedings. Additionally, states (e.g. UK, Spain and Belgium) have largely amended their Universal Jurisdiction laws so that they are less prone to abuse by anti-Israeli individuals, lawyers, and organizations. Foreign courts have also recognized the independence of the Israeli legal system and its ability to handle allegations and complex matters. All of the above notwithstanding, continued success in this regard necessitates continuous monitoring and high alert, addressing and winning every single lawsuit attempt, given the risk of precedent-setting in the legal arena.

- **Anti-BDS Legislation** — After several years in which lawfare was a key tool of the anti-Israel campaign, albeit without significant successes, over the past two years, the pro-Israel network has taken major legal initiatives, primarily in the U.S. and Spain.º

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º Two striking examples in this context are the following:

- **The US: Advancing anti-BDS legislation** – since The New York State Senate became the first body to pass an anti-BDS bill (1/2014), a wave of anti-BDS legislation has swept across the US. To date, 14 states have passed anti-BDS legislation (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) and the State of New York is under an executive order from the governor to not do business with companies that boycott Israel) and the approval of President Obama of provisions making rejection of Israel boycott a key objective in trade talks with EU;

- **Spain: Turning the legal table on BDS** – Spain has been a hub of delegitimization efforts and BDS with, e.g., some 50 Spanish municipalities that had passed resolutions in recent years endorsing BDS, more than in any other European country. Yet recent successful legal offensive led by ACOM, a pro-Israeli nonprofit, BDS has been recently labeled discriminatory in a series of legal defeats. Over the past year, pro-Israel activists have obtained 24 rulings, legal opinions and injunctions against BDS in Spain, and as a result BDS motions have been rejected in a dozen Spanish municipalities.
These initiatives are transforming the playing field of the BDS movement, although it remains to be seen whether they will significantly limit its growth.7

- **In the U.S., most public BDS attempts have failed** to initiate the adoption of boycotts and sanctions against or and divestment from Israel;
- **A variety of effective tools were developed to engage bystanders and the ‘Long-Tail,’** such as visits to Israel, marketing and messaging platforms, and Israel education programs;
- **The pro-Israel community has greatly improved its capacity to develop and distribute its messages,** primarily in social media.

### The Delegitimization Network: Steep Learning Curve and Resilience

24. **As mentioned above, the delegitimization network has faced growing opposition by the pro-Israel network since 2010. In spite of this opposition, and perhaps also due to it, the delegitimization movement has become much more professional and better organized both tactically and strategically.** Thus, the delegitimization network has shown itself to be adaptive and resilient in its ability to increase its agility and pace of innovation. Some of the major changes are:

- **Growing institutionalization and professionalization of the movement,** with an emphasis on increased and more sophisticated usage of legal (e.g. Palestine Legal) and commercial tools within the corporate world (e.g. Who Profits). This aspect also includes more robust organizations e.g., SJP and JVP and better training for activists;
- **Co-opting of international organizations** – While delegitimization of Israel in United Nations institutions has been a long-standing challenge, in recent years, additional international institutions are being targeted for blatant anti-Israel activities. Examples include ICC, ICJ, UNHRC and FIFA;
- **Expansion to new arenas** – The delegitimization network constantly seeks to reinvent itself through new methods and arenas e.g. the drop of the “Mega Events” method in favor of the legal and economic channels and the use of the rules of Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) are two examples;
- **Targeting Jewish communities due to their association with Israel** – Diaspora Jewry and individual Jews are increasingly held responsible for the actions and policies of the State of Israel. This results in Diaspora Jews as targets for criticism and, at times, even violence due to their perceived connection to Israel and/or dual loyalty.

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7 There are plenty of local legislative motion, especially in the state level in the US to block boycotts against Israel. These initiatives are based on the Federal Anti-Boycott Regulations, which primarily deal with withholding support from Israeli businesses. Read more: [Anti-Boycott Regulations Definition | Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/anti-boycott-regulations.asp).
25. **Consequently, by 2016, the delegitimization movement can also boast significant successes**, particularly, and not by order of importance:

- **An unfavorable Zeitgeist around Israel persists in many places around the world**, especially in large urban centers and on college campuses.

- **BDS gains ground among Palestinians in the West Bank** – In contrast to the common perception, BDS ideas originally emanated from Europe, and were initially received within the Palestinian Authority with mix reactions ranging from rejection to antagonism.\(^8\) Moreover, the Palestinian Authority has been treating BDS activists as trouble-makers and law-breakers and even arrested some of them. However, recent polls suggest that BDS ideas are becoming more popular among Palestinians,\(^9\) and it seems that BDS has also influenced the PA’s "diplomatic intifada;"

- While many public BDS efforts have failed, **there is a growing silent boycott of Israeli products, academics, artists, and athletes**, although its actual economic effect is hard to measure;

- **The anti-Israel network is global**, with global ‘brands’ such as Israel Apartheid Week spanning the globe. **It has expanded from Europe to the U.S. and many other locations worldwide**, effectively present in many American cities and campuses, and has increasingly deepened its alliances with major minority groups and social justice coalitions under the framework of ‘intersectionality;’

- **The BDS movement has gained support from a small number of Jews who are critical of Israeli policies and benefits from their participation. This participation includes the support and cooperation of some Israeli organizations who seek to encourage external international pressure to affect the policies of the State of Israel;**

- **The delegitimization movement has had a degree of success in singling out Israel** among companies, sensitive to and invested in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),\(^10\) as well as among socially responsible investors (SRI).\(^11\)**

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\(^8\) Although BDS portrays itself as an umbrella organization with dozens of backers in Palestine, in practice most of the Palestinian civil society organizations that are listed as BDS supporters are marginal and usually consist of a very small operation.

\(^9\) Poll taken by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in 2015 reported that 86 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in favor of an economic boycott against Israel (see here - http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2055%20fulltext%20English%20final.pdf).

\(^10\) CSR - Corporates today face an increasing expectation to have a greater degree of responsibility for the social and environmental implication of their activities. This trend is expanding very quickly, as indicated by the fact that all the founding documents of this issue were written only after the year 2010.
opment of these trends reflects a global trend, unconnected to Israel. However, the BDS movement has been quick to use this trend, branding multinational corporations as “profiteers from this apartheid.” Notable BDS tactics include: public campaigns against MNCs, shareholder activism, advocacy directed at investors and asset managers, and lobbying ethical committees in governments;

- **Delegitimization has migrated into mainstream left-wing parties in Europe**, such as in England and in Sweden, and may be gaining traction among certain political factions in the U.S.

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SRI - The investment approach which seeks to consider both financial return and social good is becoming more prevalent and guides the investment strategies of many funds. The popularity of demand for ethics screening companies, which offer research and analysis of the ethical performance of corporates, is rising.
Emerging Challenges

26. The challenges below were identified as issues of rising importance in opposing the assault on Israel’s legitimacy. Each of these issues requires a comprehensive learning process and extensive experimentalizations with new activities. In this document, we present these challenges, the basic dilemmas they raise, and a few insights about potential action. Many of these topics will be explored in greater depth in future analysis.

Intersectionality

27. The rise of identity politics and intersectionality – The past several years are marked by prominence of identity politics, which lead to a climate that ascribes considerable significance and meaning to individual and group identity. The related concept of intersectionality, which emphasizes the relationship of identity to power, has given oppressed groups an important shared language with which to fight for greater recognition and inclusion. Together, identity politics and intersectionality enable these social groups, to unite in solidarity in addressing shared, yet distinct experiences of marginalization and discrimination, even if they have little in common.

28. The Palestinian cause has been widely adopted as a core and prominent threshold for solidarity by many marginalized groups. At the same time, Jewish identity in America has undergone a significant shift, from self-perception as a marginalized and disenfranchised community, to one increasingly seen by outsiders as a privileged social group. This has significant implications: Jews are often excluded from coalitions of solidarity formed among members of oppressed groups, often along racial lines, and Jewishness, understood within the privileged/oppressed dichotomy, can be projected onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, confirming the basic categories by which Israel is portrayed as the oppressor and the Palestinians as the oppressed. In the aftermath of the 2016 Presidential election in the United States, there will be opportunities to test whether groups that feel threatened by an increasingly hostile environment (e.g. Latino immigrants and Muslim Americans) will be more receptive to welcoming American Jews into coalitions based on an understanding of vulnerability of Jewish communities to shared threats.

29. The anti-Israel network has been able to frame the Palestinian struggle against Israel as part of the struggle of other disempowered minorities, such as African-Americans, Latinos and the LGBTQ community. Having become a permanent feature of this loose “solidarity coalition” the anti-Israel network has largely succeeded in introducing as litmus tests for inclusion possessing a single view toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the basis for membership.
30. Some principles designed to address this emerging trend include the following:

- **Partnering with other minority communities based on shared values and common interests**, such as on criminal justice reform, immigration rights or in fighting against racism, bigotry and hate crimes. Only authentic solidarity can feasibly serve long-term fundamental legitimacy of Israel within these communities (as opposed to an expectation of gains based on transactional relations). As noted above, in the aftermath of the 2016 Presidential election there is an opportunity and necessity to re-engage in such partnerships and reassess the state of communal relations;

- **Relationship-based approach and regaining credibility**: Most successes by the pro-Israel network were achieved by local leaders activating long-standing relationships with relevant and significant stakeholders in their local communities. Thus, it is in the best interest of Israel and the Jewish community to strive to re-acquire credibility and regaining a level of respect among minorities based on ground work, commitment, and experience or knowledge of issues of common interest.

**European Experience and Engagement with the Muslim Community**

31. The European experience teaches few key lessons about Jewish-Muslim relations:

- A disproportionately large number of European Muslims, even those born in Europe whose families originate from nations who are not in conflict with Israel, demonstrate a higher degree of anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israel views compared to non-Muslims in Europe.

- Much of the most aggressive anti-Israel activities are led by the infrastructure of radical Islam in Europe, namely by radicalized mosques, individual imams, schools (‘madrasas’), and a variety of non-governmental organizations, often associated with the Islamic Brotherhood ideology.

32. Therefore, it is important for the North-American Jewish community to follow closely the development of radical Islam in the USA, and at the same time to engage with the American Muslim community based on a joint commitment to address violent extremism\(^{12}\) as well as Islamophobia. While a priority should be given to national initiatives, organizations should consider prioritizing communal relations in cities and institutions characterized by legacy of strong anti-Israel activity with large Muslim population, such as Chicago, as well as within locations that have experienced a rise in anti-Muslim activity or violence.

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Anti-Normalization

33. Anti-Normalization (tatbi‘a تطبيع) is a concept originating in the Arab world, which calls for a rejection of any political, economic, social, cultural, or educational ties with Israel that would transform the relationship with Israel from abnormal to normal, or which would allow for the integration of Israel into the Middle East.¹³ Moderate views in the Arab world, as represented by the Arab Peace Initiative, view normalization as a "carrot," which will be used only once the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved. Others, such as the members of the Moqawama Network (see above) reject any semblance of normalization with Israel (although they are willing to acknowledge Israel’s existence as a gloomy fact, and even to negotiate with it indirectly to ensure their basic interests). A highly visible example of anti-normalization is the unwillingness of Muslim and Arab athletes to compete against Israelis in international competitions such as the Olympic Games. Increasingly, anti-normalization has been extended to include groups that either advocate for Israel or even Israelis seeking to engage in peace-building or dialogue work.

34. The BDS movement has adopted the anti-normalization approach and strives to expand it to Europe and the U.S. – This logic, which the BDS movement officially endorsed in 2007 and constitutes a key component of Students for Justice in Palestine's (SJP) strategy. It drives the adoption of the more extreme tactics of the delegitimization campaign and undermines a-priori any attempt at dialogue and bridge-building, including of programs and organizations sponsored by the international community, such as One-Voice or IPCRI. At its worst, anti-normalization can legitimizes the harassment of Jews and provides the rationale for the exclusion of Jews from various coalitions, even when they are not directly related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

35. Anti-normalization has become a dominant within Israeli-Arab politics– Propagated predominantly by the Arab nationalist party in Israel, Balad, the anti-normalization approach was adopted by The Joint List,¹⁴ when it rejected even a limited surplus vote-sharing agreement with the Israeli left-wing party, Meretz. A new dynamic is observable and increasing of cooperation between the global delegitimization movement and BDS with members of Balad.

36. The pro-Israel network needs to highlight The inherent paradox in the BDS approach – On the one hand, BDS delegitimizes any Israeli-Palestinian cooperation as long as Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands continues; on the other hand, without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and negotiation there is no possible way to bring about the end of occupation. Thus, BDS is agnostic to the fate of the Palestinians and often contradicts their actual interests.

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¹⁴ The Joint List, composed of three Arab parties and one joint Jewish-Arab party, was established in the lead-up to the 2015 elections after the electoral threshold was raised and presents itself as representing the majority the Arab citizens of Israel.
37. Viable and positive examples of cooperation among Israeli Jewish and Israeli Arab NGOs, often including international engagement by Jewish communities, need to be amplified and expanded to serve as a counterweight to the growing anti-normalization efforts of elected Israeli Arab political leaders. Investment in these activities should deepen and extend thereby raising the cost of BDS.

The Breakdown of the Two-State Solution

38. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides the main leverage for Israel's fundamental delegitimization. While the ideological framework for Israel's delegitimization was solidified at the first Durban Conference in 2001, its momentum has been boosted by reactions to Israeli military campaigns that have occurred in 2009, 2012 and 2014, coupled with the lack of progress in the political process that would lead to a two-state solution, the outcome preferred by the mainstream international community.

39. Although BDS does not express explicit support for the so-called one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the official call of the Movement includes the right of return for Palestinian refugees which inevitably would eliminate the Jewish and democratic state of Israel and, in practice, many of its leaders are "one-staters" and have been working to undermine the two-state solution (see Reut's paper, "The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization against Israel").

40. Based on this understanding, the strategy of the pro-Israel network has been based on the demonstrable commitment of Israel's government to a two-state solution. Israel's ability to demonstrate a consistent and credible commitment to ending the control over the Palestinian population has been indispensable for combating delegitimization. The working assumption that this shared is the end-goal has served as the basis for attempts to build a broad coalition against BDS (the 'broad tent').

41. On the ground, the breakdown of the peace process and increasing doubts regarding Israel's commitment to it have fueled the expansion of the delegitimization movement, particularly since 2014. Clearly, the erosion of the support for Israel among liberal and progressive cohorts is impacted by the growing criticism of Israel’s policies regarding the Palestinians in the West Bank, the absence of a peace-process, and the continuation of the settlements policy. In other words, the inability of governmental action to provide a political horizon for this conflict legitimizes, energizes and emboldens non-governmental grassroots action.

Eroding Perceptions of Israel’s Commitment to Pluralism, Democracy and Peace

42. In recent years, the perception of Israel as a peace-seeking, pluralistic and democratic state (PPD) has eroded. The weakening perception of Israel’s PPD nature cannot be divorced from the assault on Israel’s legitimacy.

43. This dynamic is exacerbated by the global trend of polarization of the political discourse, which has not bypassed Israel, and seems to have reached new heights in recent years, on both sides of the political spectrum. While Israel's right-wing government is often portrayed as ‘fascist’ and ‘racist’ by its prominent political rivals, the left can be associated with ‘treason’ and ‘subversion’. In this climate, the delegit-
Imposition movement is effectively able to leverage genuine injustices that require change to substantiate its argument that the entire political model of Israel is corrupt. Its key claims:

- **The mistreatment of the indigenous population – the Arab citizens of Israel** – The delegitimization movement frames the Arab citizens of Israel as a disenfranchised indigenous population, which is being increasingly marginalized by legislation, government policies, and public discourse. This framing naturally enhances the challenge posed by the trend of intersectionality;

- **A crack-down on dissenting voices** – Several Knesset legislative initiatives, such as the NGO law\(^\text{15}\), are framed as an organized attack on the democratic nature of the state.

44. **While the trend of polarization of the political discourse is not unique to Israel, the unique context of the delegitimization campaign makes its consequence for Israel more dramatic.**

45. **Notwithstanding, it is a conclusion and key message of this report that a credible and consistent commitment to PPD, among others to the full integration and equality of Israel’s Arab citizens and to the rule of law and free speech are not only a moral imperative, but would also weaken the claims of Israel’s delegitimizers.**

**Palestinian Confrontational Diplomacy**

46. **The common perception within the pro-Israel community is that the assault on Israel’s legitimacy is a sophisticated Palestinian campaign.** The core statement of BDS leaders asserting that it was founded upon a call from the Palestinian civil society affirms this misconception.

47. **In practice, however, there are actually only a handful of Palestinian leaders or activists in the BDS movement — which remains an almost entirely Western phenomenon.** While negating Israel’s right to exist is common among Palestinians, the BDS campaign itself – its strategy, practice, political agenda and terminology – are generally alien to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

48. As can be expected from a state or state-like actor, the commitment of the PA and PLO to the Two-State Solution has never been a moral one (recognizing in effect Israel’s “right” to exist), but rather a pragmatic one. In fact, the **PA seems to have internalized better than Israel the fact that its declared commitment to the Two-State Solution earns it important political and diplomatic points.**

49. **While actions taken by the PLO and the PA for statehood - even when unilater - should not be considered as delegitimization** (see Reut’s document “The

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\(^{15}\) The law, which passed in July 2016, mandates special requirements for NGOs that get most of their funding from foreign governments.
Declaration of Palestinian Statehood: An Unparalleled Political Opportunity?”), neither the PLO nor the PA have abandoned their confrontational approach towards Israel, even during negotiations.

50. Now, however, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has traditionally regarded BDS as a threat, is “flirting” with it through a new form of confrontational and defiant diplomacy. This approach occasionally explicitly undermines Israel’s legitimacy.

51. In light of the Israeli-Palestinian political deadlock, the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank and the eroding regional and international interest in the Palestinian issue – the adoption of a defiant approach by the PA has become its political raison d’être.

52. Moreover, 2017 marks 100 years since the Balfour Declaration,\textsuperscript{16} 70 years since the UN partition plan (see UN Resolution 181) and 50 years since the “Naksa” (Arabic name for the defeat of the Arabs during the 1967 Six-Day War) – all seen by the Palestinians as important historical and symbolic benchmarks that explain their gloomy geo-political reality.

53. There are several arenas hosting the current Palestinian “flirtation” with the delegitimization campaign:

- **Confrontational diplomacy and lawfare** – The PA has been conducting a diplomatic and judicial confrontation of Israel in the international community. This manifests in leveraging their membership in international treaties and organizations (e.g., the International Criminal Court and UNESCO) in order to attack Israel.

- **Calling for an expanded boycott of Israel** – Following a decision taken by the PA in 2008 to boycott goods and services from the West Bank, it is has recently expanded its call for boycott to include Israeli companies working in Israel proper as well.\textsuperscript{17}

54. **We warn that confrontational diplomacy could very well constitute a turning point in the campaign to assault Israel’s legitimacy** – as demonstrated above, up until now the delegitimization campaign has been executed almost exclusively by Western organizations, without real Palestinian backing. However, the emerging alliance between the PA and the delegitimization network – which has consequently gained access to the powers and authorities of a state in the diplomatic arena – could prove to be a game changer for Israel. **Unless properly addressed, the new form of confrontational diplomacy of the PA could complicate many aspects of the BDS campaign and**

\textsuperscript{16} Only recently, the PA announced its efforts to prepare a legal file against the UK over the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which the Palestinians see as the original sin that set the ground for the establishment of the State of Israel, see here: http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinians-seeking-to-sue-Britain-over-Balfour-Declaration-462379

\textsuperscript{17} See for example the PA ban to import product from five Israeli food companies - http://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-bans-imports-from-5-israeli-companies/
constitute a strategic surprise to Israel with meaningful national security implications.

The Silent Boycott

55. BDS efforts only seldom end up in a public boycott or avoidance of doing business with Israel as a punishment or protest. Additionally, BDS has also largely failed to hijack the CSR and SRI agenda (see above) by singling out Israel.18

56. The more common damage is caused by the silent boycott – undeclared decisions by organizations, companies and individuals to refrain from doing business with Israel or withhold cooperation and engagement with Israeli entities or with entities that have ties to Israel due to ethical concerns that are associated with it, or the desire to avoid unnecessary problems and criticism. An alarming possible explanation of this trend is the potential internalization of the sentiment promoted by the delegitimization campaign – that Israel is too morally corrupt to engage with, at any level.

57. Response principles to addressing the ‘silent boycott’ include:
   • Developing a methodology to assess the volume of the silent boycott – This is critical for getting a reliable indication of the indirect business impact of BDS, measuring the discrete influencer categories of the Zeitgeist and as an early warning for BDS expansion;
   • Identifying places prone to silent boycott and developing a global engagement strategy to address tacit and/or latent cases of boycott.

How Far Should We Take Anti-BDS Legislation?

58. Recent years have seen a surge in legislative efforts, especially in the U.S., against BDS activities. According to BDS supporters, the pro-Israel legal offensive has been an increasingly effective strategy, and has constituted a significant challenge to the BDS movement in the U.S.19

59. Free speech vs. discriminatory activity? – Legislative initiatives in a number of states have raised concerns regarding their possible violation of free speech. Future legislation need to be developed with careful consideration of this issue to avoid the potential for rallying progressive groups in coordinated opposition and "turning off" the long tail.

The challenge of Targeted Boycotts

60. The targeted boycott effort against Israeli presence in the West Bank, and particularly the settlements, is gaining momentum. This effort, exemplified by

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18 Hardly any corporate has changed its business portfolio in Israel and only very few marginal investors publicly withdrew their business from Israel or Israeli affiliated companies as a punitive measure or protest. Unilever, as an exception to the rule, moved in 2013 a snack food plant from the West Bank to Tsfat, within the 1967 borders. Other companies such as Veolia and Orange deny the change in their business conduct in Israel is related to the boycott campaign.

19 See here in an Al-Jazerra report.
product labeling by the EU, is now increasingly embraced in other forms by a coalition of Israelis and Israel-supporting self-proclaimed Zionist Jews, who frame their activities as an effort to secure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state. This trend may eventually affect many Jewish institutions.

61. The uniqueness of this challenge emanates from the difficulty to categorize it:
   
   - On the one hand, while the delegitimization movement calls for a total boycott, it occasionally supports targeted boycott as it tarnishes Israel's reputation and is easier to garner support around from the long tail. BDS leaders have said openly that tactical needs often require carrying out a selective boycott of settlement products as "the easiest way to rally support"—a milestone on the path towards a comprehensive boycott. Indeed, it is easy to make the case that partial boycotts fuel the assault on Israel’s legitimacy;
     
   - On the other hand, the call for a targeted boycott by Israelis and Jews is often driven by a genuine Zionist motivation representing a loss of trust by liberal Zionists regarding the commitment of the current Israeli government to peace. Their claim is that boycotting settlements will help to secure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state and end Israeli control over the Palestinians. Indeed, this targeted act as well as labelling West Bank products, are perceived in the world as a well-intentioned, legitimate, non-violent protest against Israeli policies aimed at "saving" Israel from itself.

62. Coupled with the expansion of settlements, the tendency of the Israeli government and pro-Israel groups to delegitimize "partial boycotters" is often perceived as a sign that Israel is not genuinely committed to the two-state solution.

63. The polarization around the issue of targeted boycott is an indication of the lack of ethical clarity necessary in order to stand united against delegitimization by fostering diverse coalitions. Compelling and constructive alternatives to targeted boycott may be critically needed.

The Decline of Jewish Communal Cohesion

The Erosion of Israel as a Unifying Force

64. Since Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014, a growing numbers of Jews have become more critical of Israel as their perception of Israel as pluralistic, peace-seeking, and democratic (PPD) is eroding.

65. This perception has been compounded by frustration over the confrontations between the Government of Israel and the Obama Administration, peaking in disputes surrounding the Iran Deal and some Israeli policies. These issues have led to reactions, which range from indifference to tacit and even explicit support for delegitimization activities. Paradoxically, a potentially warmer relationship between the new administration in Washington and the Government of Israel may exacerbate the challenges
because of strongly held negative views about the administration by many American Jews and American liberals and progressives in general.

66. **The Government of Israel seems to under-appreciate the collateral damage to Israel’s standing among Diaspora Jewish communities** created by changing perceptions of Israel. The damage done by the erosion in Israel's standing has serious implications, including in contributing to a growing internal split among Jewish communities and a growing rift between Jewish communities and the Government of Israel.

67. **These trends have resulted in the decline of Jewish communal cohesion** and the increasing polarization of the American Jewish community in regard to Israel, which undermines the political strength and efficacy of the American Jewish community. The relationship between internal Jewish communal cohesion and the ability to respond effectively to the delegitimization challenge should be appropriately appraised, as this is key to the way in which the Jewish community functions as a network to combat delegitimization.

**The Religious Gap Dividing U.S. and Israeli Jews**

68. **U.S. Jewry is undergoing its deepest-ever identity crisis**, in which the future role of Israel in Jewish identity looms large. The clash is occurring as a result of several distinct but related factors. One of them is Israel's religious establishment.

69. **Whereas U.S. Jewry is increasingly multi-cultural and diverse in its religious practice, Israel is identified with a more rigid, statist Judaism.** The dominant role of the Chief Rabbinate is widening the gap with the diverse faces of American Judaism. These dynamics are embodied, for example, in the tension around Women of the Wall and their fight for attaining social and legal recognition for praying collectively at the Western Wall. Beyond the emotional alienation this gap raises, a real obstacle is created by the Israel's Rabbinate's rejection of non-Orthodox streams of Judaism, which comprise more than 70 percent of American Jews. The rigidity represented in Israel's approach is an anathema in an American reality in which more than half of Jews intermarry.

70. **The result is that many U.S. Jews, especially among non-Orthodox denominations, identify less with Israel and are alienated more by the Jewish State.** Thus, in essence the dominant role of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel fuels indifference and tolerance toward, and a greater acceptance of, BDS activities.

71. **As a result of the above, a decreased mobilization of American Jews for Israel can be expected**, and certainly a decrease in mainstream Jewish activism for Israel. In some cases, increased Jewish anti-Israel activism is evident.
The Response: Building Adaptive Capacities

Structural and Operational Response

72. The conundrum of the 20X question implies that a key challenge for the pro-Israel network is to accelerate its learning curve in order to out-adapt the delegitimization network. Furthermore, the most important investment must be made in improving its adaptive capacities, and that such investment will provide for on-going capability to successfully meet this challenge. Naturally, such capabilities will also bolster the ability of the Jewish community and the State of Israel to confront the emerging challenges articulated above.

73. Not more, better: The key message of this Strategic Framework is that the challenge of the pro-Israel network is how to become smarter and more strategic in the use of existing resources rather than mobilizing more money and more people. In other words, the conclusion of this report is that the challenge of the pro-Israel network is more ‘qualitative’ than ‘quantitative’.

74. At the same time, our work points to a number of key operational principles that are essential for successfully defeating the movement to delegitimize Israel.

Structural Investments: Pro-Israel Network 2.0

Upgraded Capabilities in Intelligence and Strategy

75. Every successful operation in a dynamic setting requires an effective feedback loop among information-gathering and analysis, strategizing, research, development and experimentation, and operations. This feedback loop happens when information gathering and analysis work informs both activities on the ground and planning and strategy; planning and strategy should guide activities, as well as establish priorities for information gathering; and operations should provide feedback to the strategic arm and to the intelligence-gathering group.

76. This system is currently lacking and often does not exist for the pro-Israel network, and its creation is urgent and essential.

77. The structure of the response should therefore include three interrelated components:

- Information gathering and analysis, which is then disseminated to all potential users;

- Planning and strategy work, focused on crafting relevant principles for achieving success based on targeted research. The purpose of this strategic work is to inform and guide the activity of many diverse actors;
• **Operations** – activities on the ground should implement the strategies and use the information that is gathered. The outcomes of the activity, should in turn generate evaluation, more planning and improvements and also direct intelligence efforts.

**Bolstering Cyber Presence**

78. The Internet is a crucial arena for the effort to delegitimize Israel, and is equally important as a field to counter delegitimization. This is complicated terrain because of the need to balance freedom of speech while protecting the rights of users. While the pro-Israel network increasingly is active in this domain, much more can be done in the following directions:

• **Using legal measures and enforcing Terms of Service on social platforms to limit the proliferation of harassment and incitement against Jews and Israel.** This includes a mix of policy advocacy and industry engagement with corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter in a manner consistent with the recommendations of the ADL Center for Technology and Society and its Anti-Cyberhate Working Group;

• **Targeted efforts to determine when and whether top instigating organizations and individuals** employing techniques to harass and incite violence over the web and in social media or otherwise violate the law;

• **‘Bottom-up efforts’ of crowd-sourcing to enhance the adaptive capacity** of the pro-Israel network.

**Specialization**

79. **Specialization and division of labor:** many organizations which are part of the pro-Israel network have unique assets that can become the foundation for a distinct contribution to the struggle against the delegitimization of Israel and the BDS Movement. For example, while there are a few organizations which specialize in campus activity, each brings to the table different assets. Some organizations specialize in legal campaigns while others in the battle of ideas. Similarly, while some have connections with dozens of Jewish communities around the world, others own a network of dozens of offices across the U.S.

80. Thus, this report concludes that **many actors within the pro-Israel network should identify their unique added value in this struggle and leverage it through their different efforts and increased collaboration.** Such deliberate specialization among the pro-Israel network is essential for greater effectiveness.

**Supporting Small Communities and Niche Efforts**

81. The delegitimization of Israel is a highly decentralized challenge, taking place in small and large communities and across many arenas. For example, there could be acts of delegitimization in labor unions in South Africa or among corporations in Greece. In fact, due to its architecture as a network and to its character as a social movement, acts of
delegitimization against Israel can and do happen anywhere and in any field. Hence, the decentralized architecture of the delegitimization movement requires a decentralized response.

82. Consequently, it is essential to strengthen the pro-Israel network in small communities and in niche areas. In places where a sizeable Jewish community resides, mostly in major cities, of the U.S., London, Melbourne, Paris or Buenos Aires, there is often a robust response to acts of anti-Semitism and delegitimization by a well-organized and well-funded Jewish community. In fact, on many U.S. campuses, the pro-Israel community is much better funded and even bigger than the anti-Israel one. However, in smaller communities or in areas that are not within the focus on Jewish attention, response is often based on a handful of activists who operate on a shoestring. Supporting their work, should be based on the following principles:

- **Strengthening pro-Israel organizations that mobilize and coordinate a network of ‘nodes’** e.g. Jewish Community Public Affairs (JCPA) and its network of Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRCs) in the USA; Hillel, which is present in nearly five hundred locations in the U.S. and globally; the Israel Action Network (IAN) that reaches nearly 160 federations in the U.S.; or the Jewish Congress (WJC) that represents dozens of Jewish communities around the world.

- **Developing simple, flexible, and scalable platforms, tools and resources** of information-gathering, analysis and research, project management, collaboration and learning that can be used by activists in these small communities and niche arenas.

**Operational Principles**

**Success Would be to Change the Unfavorable Zeitgeist**

83. The fundamental remedy to the assault on Israel’s legitimacy can only be achieved if the Zeitgeist with regard to Israel is changed. This outcome can only be the result of a long-term, concentrated effort, whose effects accumulate over time.

84. The effect of achieving this goal would be that the fundamental legitimacy of Israel will not be challenged in the mainstream arena, and the delegitimization will be marginalized to a point where it is considered socially inappropriate.

85. Changing the Zeitgeist is an elusive objective where the whole is larger than the sum of its parts. The reason is that, while circumventing acts of delegitimization is important, even multiple successes may not result in changing the Zeitgeist. Paradoxically, high profile fights or high-visibility actions against BDS motions or the BDS Movement may even bolster BDS.

86. In fact, this report concludes that changing the Zeitgeist requires a segmented response along the different constituencies of the Long Tail.
Segmented Response along the Long Tail

87. Confronting the delegitimization campaign requires the pro-Israel network to mindfully tailor appropriate responses and/or engagement strategies for each section of the Long Tail i.e. toward the instigators, harsh critics, the soft critics and the bystanders:
- The instigators must be singled out from the other groups, and handled uncompromisingly, publicly or covertly as appropriate;
- Harsh critics should be intellectually engaged and challenged;
- Soft critics – which represent the largest group within the Long Tail – should also be addressed through sophisticated engagement strategies;
- Bystanders should first be approached and engaged through softer tools to be ‘won over’ or, at least, be inoculated from the anti-Israel propaganda.

88. The crucial ‘battle ground’ is the hearts and minds of the soft critics and bystanders. Their gravitation away from the vision of delegitimization would mean that this delegitimization movement remains marginal and ineffective. In other words, success in changing the Zeitgeist depends upon shifting them toward Israel’s favor, and driving a wedge between them and true delegitimizers.

89. Failure to understand this model and the need for tailored and segmented responses for the different constituencies can lead not only to a waste of resources but also to the counterproductive outcome of further growth of the delegitimization movement. For example, a heavy-handed approach toward soft critics may actually drive them away and closer to the anti-Israel camp, rather than bring them closer to Israel.
General Operating Principles: Narrow the Definition and Broaden the Tent

90. **A segmented response along the long tail requires narrowing the definition of delegitimization.** Such a narrow and focused definition – establishing delegitimization as the singular negation of the right of the State of Israel to exist and of the right of the Jewish People to self-determination – is crucial for success. Such a definition allows for both unity among the pro-Israel network, as well as focus on the true instigators and the deployment of distinct efforts for each of the groups along the Long Tail, thus allowing for driving the wedge between instigators and other groups.

91. **Broadening the tent: a diverse pro-Israel network is essential for dealing with the diverse base of support of the delegitimization campaign.** In fact, it requires engagement with a wide spectrum of views through a variety of approaches and tools by a diverse pro-Israel community. For example, liberal and progressive pro-Israel groups are probably most effective in engaging with soft critics of Israel, who are often also of similar outlooks. Hence, while the pro-Israel community must be united in this fight, this unity does not require uniformity of opinions. In fact, it benefits from its diversity and even from the deep disagreements among it, which are required for effective engagement with the long tail and for achieving success.

92. **However, even a broad tent has limits, and therefore establishing red lines with regards to the discourse on Israel is also essential:**

- **On the left, the red lines need to distinguish between legitimate criticism and acts of delegitimization.** Such a slippage can occur when criticism is consistently and repeatedly one-sided, not nuanced and without context, for example, when placing all the blame for the current state of the political process with the Palestinians on Israel. This is particularly sensitive since such criticism can quickly feed into the delegitimization campaign;

- **On the right, the red lines also need to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and delegitimization.** In this case, when legitimate criticism is framed as an act of delegitimization and its conveyers as delegitimizers, the pro-Israel community is fragmented and drawn into infighting. In fact, liberal Zionist Jewish organizations are the most effective tools against delegitimization among liberal progressive circles. Moreover, efforts to combat delegitimization will fail if they are accompanied by anti-Muslim sentiments that push soft critics and bystanders toward the delegitimization movement”

93. **In contrast, the narrow tent approach, which broadens the definition of delegitimization and excludes progressive groups, is counter-productive.** Some pro-Israel groups expand the definition of delegitimization to include criticism of Israel and even of the Israeli government. Consequently, they are not only spreading their resources thin on a much larger group of organizations and individuals, but also alienating key players on the progressive and liberal side of the pro-Israel community.

94. **Furthermore, it should be noted that the breakthrough of the campaign to delegitimize Israel occurred when it embraced its own ‘broad tent’ approach.**
The instigators of that movement have been willing to overlook ideological differences and to collaborate tactically against Israel across a broad spectrum of opinions, and even with self-proclaimed Zionists and Israelis who are ‘just’ critical of Israeli policies.

95. **The confluence of the delegitimizers' 'open tent' approach with Israel's 'narrow tent' approach is leading to Israel's camp being outnumbered.**

96. **Finally, the unique role of Jewish peoplehood organizations must be acknowledged:** Some organizations within the Jewish community, primarily Federations, Hillel centers, JCRCs and JCCs, were established on the logic of peoplehood with the aim of serving the entire Jewish community across its diversity. Specifically for such organizations, a narrow definition of delegitimization that focuses on the delegitimizers is essential for their ability to serve their mission, and a broad definition compromises it.

**Legitimacy Surplus**

97. **Creating a legitimacy surplus** – alongside the efforts to circumvent delegitimization, a clear pro-active and positive campaign aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of Israel is vital for changing the *Zeitgeist*. This includes:

- **Positive messaging and branding** – It is necessary to reframe the context through which people hear about Israel so as to associate it with ‘positive’ values, such as innovation, creativity, and its contribution to humanity.

- **Israel engagement programs** – While the challenges of Israel engagement have increased due to the ongoing assault on Israel, this also created an opportunity to reconnect across the dividing lines within the Jewish community.

- **Tikkun Olam projects**: Beyond their intrinsic value for humanity, projects of social justice that contribute to humanity and build the good standing of Israel and the Jewish people are essential for mobilizing the pro-Israel movement and for engaging with the Long Tail and with the Bystanders.

**Doubling Down on Europe and Other Crucial Places**

98. While this report has a significant emphasis on the U.S., it is important to note that the challenge of the delegitimization of Israel is much more acute across Europe and in South Africa. Meanwhile, in recent years the majority of resources and attention has been focused just within the U.S., and particularly on campuses.

99. While this issue was not covered in depth in this report, we generally recommend that the pro-Israel network double-down on the fight against the delegitimi-
zation in other locations, particularly in Europe, South Africa, and Latin America. The logic here is three-fold: first, there are sizable Jewish communities there, which require protection. Second, these nations are important for Israel. Third, there is a tremendous learning opportunity in these places, where the fights are much fiercer and on much worse terms compared to the U.S. Similar logic applies to smaller arenas where delegitimization persists. For example, it is important to counter-balance the over-concentration on American campuses with a greater allocation of resources and attention to SRI, churches, and labor unions.

Marginalizing Delegitimizers and Instigators

100. **Expose the true colors of the delegitimizers to drive a wedge between them and the rest of the long tail:** While intending to express opposition to Israeli policies, many of the Harsh Critics, often unwittingly, engage alongside anti-Zionists in acts of delegitimization such as supporting BDS. However, when delegitimization was narrowly defined (as negating Israel’s right to exist and the right of the Jewish people to self-determination), and when the true colors of BDS were exposed, even notable Harsh Critics were quick to denounce BDS for being too radical.

101. **At the same time, high-visibility response by the pro-Israel side can be counterproductive,** by serving the anti-Israel network and amplifying its successes. Many times, it was the heavy-handed response of pro-Israeli groups that generated mainstream media coverage for marginal BDS events.

102. **Early warning and pre-emption of experiments** - when Israel's delegitimizers try new methods or new arenas and locations for various activities and campaigns it is important to decisively counter them - so they are not replicated elsewhere. It is often more effective to focus on new instances of delegitimization and on ‘experiments’ of methods, rather than on routine manifestations.
Harsh Critics: Winning the Battle of Ideas through Thought Leadership and Specialized Research

103. **The Mission: Achieve “Conceptual Superiority” over the delegitimization movement** – transforming the pro-Israel network into a significant and sustained adaptive entity will over time grant the network with a conceptual superiority. Being conceptually superior means that the tools and resources utilized in the service of the pro-Israel objectives will be more relevant than the tools and resources of the delegitimization movement. Achieving this goal will necessitate defined and clear goals and a richer understanding of the strategic environment and the trends which design it.

104. **Since the delegitimization movement is founded on intellectual arguments that challenge the foundations of Zionism, there is a need to intellectually match those arguments in an equally appealing and sophisticated manner.** There is therefore a need for institutions that are dedicated to and specialize in the waging of this battle of ideas, specifically within progressive discourse. Such institutions should develop specialized capabilities to engage with anti-Israel arguments made by opinion leaders, in prominent media outlets, as well as within specific niches such as labor unions, professional associations or churches.

The Long Tail and the Bystanders Are the True Battleground

105. **The battleground between Israel and its allies, and the delegitimizers is over substantially engaging with those Soft Critics.**

106. **Mobilizing this constituency to stand against delegitimization requires substantively responding to their concerns.**

107. **Building personal relationships.** The pro-Israel movement has developed a diverse tool-kit and specialized organizations for engaging various constituencies that comprise the ‘Long Tail,’ such as academics, student leaders, journalists or religious leaders. This has been done through a variety of programs such as Israel visits, educational initiatives, messaging and marketing highlighting Israel’s humanistic facets, and alternative political engagement opportunities (invest vs. divest). This portfolio is crucially significant and should be a site for further innovation and expansion.

108. **Developing new platforms and programs for substantive engagement of the Long Tail.** The availability and ease with which an individual can get involved in BDS or

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21 These conclusions were drawn based on a segmentation study and analysis that was co-funded by the Brand Israel Group (BIG) and the Conference of Presidents. This research suggests that the humanity of the Israeli people is what resonates strongest with most Americans. The study demonstrated that the key is to emphasize the creative, diverse, indomitable, moral and personable nature of the Israelis.
anti-normalization, combined with the open-tent approach of the delegitimization campaign (see above) has led to the impressive growth of the BDS movement in the U.S. particularly among liberal and progressive circles. The pro-Israel network’s challenge is to create competitively appealing programs and alternatives for political action that also focus on the contested issues regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiatives which provide meaningful avenues to promote coexistence and societal enhancement.

109. **Invest in Bystanders and broaden the conversation** – For those who don’t have their mind set on Israel yet, it is important to share positive stories and allow an intermediate connection with Israelis. It is inadvisable to allow the conflict to define Israel, and a "pre-emptive" strategy aiming at showcasing Israel’s side in the conflict among the Bystanders, is unlikely to be effective. Only once the positive emotional connection has been set, then "Hasbarah" tactics may be effective.

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22 These conclusions are based on the work of the U.S. Segmentation Study of Applied Marketing Innovation (Fern Oppenheim, prepared for the Conference of Presidents, 2011) and the Mellman Group Focus Group Analysis (prepared for the IAN, 2014).
In Conclusion: Greater Focus on Adaptive Capacities

110. Our goal was to create a Strategic Framework against the delegitimization of Israel that would serve the entire field. Our success will be determined by the extent to which this report will actually serve others and be viewed as valuable to them. We look forward to discussing it over the coming few months.

111. As mentioned, this report is based on months of extensive fieldwork, research, and many hours of strategy-crafting. Nonetheless, key aspects of the delegitimization and BDS challenges remain only shallowly explored, and require further research and investigation, and multiple issues and areas would benefit from additional in-depth focused work, which we and others should conduct in the months to come.

112. The ‘20x Question’ is indeed frustrating. But one aspect of it is encouraging: over the past six years the pro-Israel community has shown remarkable mobilization and growth as it stood up to the challenge of the delegitimization of Israel. It has gravitated from a being a neglect to a condition of overflowing resources and abundance of talent.

113. Now the challenge is qualitative and not quantitative: to leverage this investment into a global network that effectively achieves the desired outcome: to marginalize delegitimization in the years to come.

End.
Annex: List of Experts

- **Alon, Kfir.** Elections Officer, Israeli Delegation to the UN.
- **Anshen, S. Mark.**
- **Armony, Lisa.** Executive Director, Hillel Foundation of Orange County, Rose Project of JFFS.
- **Aronoff, Gideon.** Chief Executive Director, Ameinu.
- **Baime, Jacob.** Executive Director, Israel on Campus Coalition.
- **Balanson, Naftali.** Chief of Staff, NGO Monitor
- **Bell, Ari.** Middle Eastern Affairs Analyst, Israel office, Anti-Defamation League.
- **Bob, Kenneth.** President, Ameinu.
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- **Catarivas, Dan.** Director, Division of Foreign Trade & International Relations.
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- **Gilboord, Noam.** Director of Community Strategy, Israel Action Network.
- **Gavrieli Tzahi, Deputy Director General, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs**
- **Gomes de Mesquita, Sonia.** Chief Program Officer, World Jewish Congress
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• **Luxembourg, Assaf.** CEO, crowdmi.

• **Malka, Tina.** Associate Director of Israel Education, Hillel International.

• **Maniv, Omri.** Correspondent, Channel 10.

• **Marcus, Prof. Ken.** President and General Counsel The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law.
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